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A B S T R A C T
Recently socio-hydrology models have been proposed to analyze the interplay of community risk-coping
culture, ﬂooding damage and economic growth. These models descriptively explain the feedbacks between
socio-economic development and natural disasters such as ﬂoods. Complementary to these descriptive
models, we develop a dynamic optimizationmodel, where the inter-temporal decision of an economic agent
interacts with the hydrological system.We assume a standardmacro-economic growthmodel where agents
derive utility from consumption and output depends on physical capital that can be accumulated through
investment. To this framework we add the occurrence of ﬂooding events which will destroy part of the
capital. We identify two speciﬁc periodic long term solutions and denote them rich and poor economies.
Whereas rich economies can afford to invest in ﬂood defense and therefore avoid ﬂood damage and develop
high living standards, poor economies prefer consumption instead of investing in ﬂood defense capital and
end up facing ﬂood damages every time the water level rises like e.g. the Mekong delta. Nevertheless, they
manage to sustain at least a low level of physical capital. We identify optimal investment strategies and
compare simulations with more frequent, more intense and stochastic high water level events.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Since the beginning of time, people have settled close to rivers
and this is still the case nowadays. Rivers enable ways of trans-
port, supply water for industry and agriculture and enhance the
quality of living due to lively nature and beautiful scenery. How-
ever, living close to rivers also involves the risk of ﬂooding, one
of the most devastating natural threats on Earth (Ohl and Tapsell,
2000), whose impact has increased over the past decades in many
regions of the world (Dankers et al., 2014, Hall et al., 2014). In order
to avoid ﬂood damage, societies have developed projects involving
structural defenses (e.g., dams. levees, retention basins) and non-
structural measures (e.g., land-planning, insurance, forecasting, see
e.g. Kundzewicz, 2002). These investments are costly, but may avoid
damage in the future. This is an interesting dynamic trade-off struc-
ture which we aim to analyze in a stylized socio-hydrological model
that is embedded in a macroeconomic set-up. To account for the
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dynamic nature of optimal investment strategies, we apply dynamic
optimization methods.
Floods and their consequences have been studied with differ-
ent model approaches: Recent Integrated Assessment Models (IAM)
aim to understand the interaction of society and ﬂoods (Merz et al.,
2014) in a broad context. Climate change leads to more and bigger
ﬂoods in certain regions Milly et al. (2002). Such models typically do
not account for the impact of changes in the environment on eco-
nomic growth (Estrada et al., 2015). The aim of Agent Based Models
(ABM) such as Dawson et al. (2011), Safarzyska et al. (2013) and
Li et al. (2015) is to understand the impact of ﬂoods on individual
behavior. ABMs can provide a qualitative analysis of the conse-
quences of ﬂoods on different levels: the individual/micro-level,
the aggregated economy/macro-level and the ﬁrm level/meso-level.
Complementary Input–Output-Models (Hasegawa Ryoji, Koks et al.,
2014) provide a quantitative cost–beneﬁt-analysis of case stud-
ies. Okuyama (2007) analyzed these model frameworks as well as
computational equilibrium models for disasters. A dynamic spatial
computable general equilibrium model based on the dynamic struc-
ture of a Ramsey growth model was developed by Nakajima et al.
(2014) to numerically measure ﬂood damage costs. It displays the
dynamic tradeoff between the costs today and future savings, invest-
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2016.06.014
0921-8009/ © 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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ments and consumption. Besides simulation modeling approaches,
optimization models have been developed to calculate optimal dike
heights (Brekelmans et al., 2012, Chahim et al., 2012, Eijgenraam,
2006). Larger stochastic programming models in water resource
management and ﬂood management (Kleywegt et al., 2002, Li et al.,
2007, Liu et al., 2014, Needham et al., 2000) only allow optimal
solutions for discrete variables and ﬁnite time horizon. Moreover,
most of these models are linear, have only one control variable,
either none or linear constraints and are therefore quite different to
the proposed economic growth model in our paper. While existing
models on ﬂood management have focused on the analysis at the
ﬁrm level (e.g. Chahim et al., 2013 and Eijgenraam et al., 2014, who
apply impulse control models for optimal dike heightening within
an economic cost–beneﬁt decision problem to minimize the sum
of the investment and expected damage cost), our model aims to
include ﬂood dynamics into a macroeconomic growth model. So
far, ﬂoods have been rarely analyzed in a macroeconomic model
of economic growth considering not only direct and indirect dam-
age costs, but also loss of future potential economic growth through
dynamic consumption and investment decisions. In environmental
economics this approach is quite common. Economic growth mod-
els have been applied to study, e.g., the effect of climate change on
long run economic growth (Xepapadeas et al., 2005). More formally,
these models commonly postulate that pollution causes economic
losses via a damage function that is positively related to an increasing
temperature caused by pollution (Millner and Dietz, 2015, Morisugi
and Mutoh, 2012, Rezai et al., 2014, Zemel, 2015). Pollution itself
is commonly modeled via the ﬂow or stock of emissions. Indeed,
emissions and investment in emission abatement have strong analo-
gies to extreme water events (ﬂoods, droughts) and investment in
abatement (ﬂood defense capital, reservoirs), respectively. It there-
fore seems an obvious choice to apply this modeling framework
also in the context of ﬂood modeling. Similar to the increase in the
temperature that underlies the economic damage in climate change
models, the water level underlies the occurrence of ﬂoodings and
hence the economic damage. There is a new research line, socio-
hydrology, that deals with such coupled systems. The main thrust
of socio-hydrology is to add a new perspective to former models
and studies in hydrology by coupling dynamics of human popula-
tions, economic growth and general resource availability (Levy et al.,
2016, Sivapalan et al., 2012). Socio-hydrology aims at understand-
ing emergent patterns and paradoxes that result from long-term
co-evolution of non-linearly coupled human–water systems. Elshafei
et al. (2014) and Sivapalan and Blöschl (2015) developed proto-
type frameworks for socio-hydrology models. Di Baldassarre et al.
(2013) and Viglione et al. (2014) developed a socio-hydrology model
to explain the feedbacks between settlements close to rivers and
ﬂooding events. Di Baldassarre et al. (2015) use the model to cap-
ture processes such as the levee effect (e.g., Montz and Tobin, 2008)
and the adaptation effect (IPCC, 2012, Mechler and Bouwer, 2014,
Penning-Rowsell, 1996), which traditional ﬂood risk models do not
include. Pande et al. (2014) were one of the ﬁrst who added a water
relatedproblem to a standard economicmodel of ﬁnitely lived agents,
the so-called overlapping-generations model (OLG). In this paper,
we build a macro-economic model in the context of ﬂoods and use
a dynamic optimization model which is a different perspective from
themore commondescriptivemodels, simulations and scenario anal-
yses. This is wherewe regard ourmodel to add to the literature. More
speciﬁcally, while there exist economic growth models that include
the feedback between the environment and economic output, our
novel contribution is to add an exogenous time varying water level
function and study the resulting optimal path of consumption and
investment. Mathematically this poses the challenge that we have
to solve a non-autonomous optimization model.
Our model uses the model of Di Baldassarre et al. (2013) and
Viglione et al. (2014) as a starting point. Their simulations show
that building high levees leads to fewer ﬂooding events with higher
impacts which may slow down economic growth. Protecting a set-
tlement by levees can, however, increase the damage to downstream
settlement due to the loss of ﬂood retention volume. Furthermore,
building levees or any other defense capital will lower ﬂooding prob-
ability andmay therefore increase the willingness of citizens to build
close to the river. If water levels rise higher than the crest of the lev-
ees, the physical capital next to the river is destroyed. Since there is
a higher physical capital stock next to the river, the ﬂood hits even
harder on the economy.
Based on their model set-up we build an economic model to ana-
lyze the tradeoffs and feedbacks associated with settlements close
to rivers. In the original model, decisions depend on social memory
that is accumulated after the experience of ﬂooding events and then
decays over time. In our economic model framework memory is cap-
tured in the dynamics of the state variables which reﬂect investment
and consumption decisions in the past that are related to ﬂooding
events. But also future choices are taken into account. We assume a
social planner who decides optimally on investment and consump-
tion to maximize not only current but also long term utility. The
concept of utility constitutes a mathematical representation of pref-
erences. Preferences in our model are formed over consumption but
may also be inﬂuenced by social status (e.g. Fisher and Hof, 2005).
We abstract from social status or other forms of social norms and val-
ues in our model and our utility function does not change over time
to ensure an unambiguous assignment of feedbacks. Moreover we
assume that our decision maker represents a social planner whose
aim is to maximize the discounted stream of current and future util-
ity of consumption by choosing the time path of investment and
consumption and taking into account the dynamics of physical and
defense capital. The trade-off for the decision maker is between con-
sumption and investment where the former reduces and the latter
augments the capital stock. As typical for economic problems, this
trade-off is constrained by the total output, i.e. consumption and
investment cannot exceed the output generated. Hencewe are facing
a standard economic decision problem of optimization under scarce
resources.
We assume two types of capital: physical capital and defense cap-
ital. Decisionmakers can invest in physical capital, such as machines,
buildings and infrastructure. On the other hand, investments in
defense capital can avoid the actual damage of ﬂoods and have
thereby a positive inﬂuence on output. Total output of the economy
consequently depends on both capital stocks. We apply a periodic
non-autonomous exogenous function to represent the water level.
The periodic water function is introduced in Grames et al. (2015).
Even though the assumption of non-stochastic ﬂood occurrence is
a strong one, we believe that useful insights on the system can
still be obtained. Alternatively, we can interpret our water func-
tion as approximation of past ﬂood events. Assuming the periodic
non-autonomous exogenous function for ﬂood occurrence allows us
to solve the dynamic optimization problem, for which we further
develop the solution method of Moser et al. (2014) where a similar
mathematical problem in the context of renewable energy has been
solved.
Including a non-autonomous exogenous deterministic function
into a dynamic decision framework over an inﬁnite time horizon
requires already quite sophisticated methodologies of optimization
and a highly challenging numerical approach. If we would model
the water level function stochastically, the long run optimization
problem could neither be solved analytically nor numerically. Recent
research in that ﬁeld of stochastic optimization is using much sim-
pler objective and state functions (Nisio, 2015) without such strong
nonlinearities as they exist in our model. Climate models include
uncertainty in the timing of events (Tsur andWithagen, 2013), where
the hazard rate of the event can depend on e.g. a stock of pollu-
tion of greenhouse gases (Zemel, 2015). Our exogenous water level
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function does not depend on any state variable, so the solution
method applied in e.g. Zemel (2015) cannot be transferred to our
model. Moreover, climate change models with an exogenous haz-
ard rate capture only one random event (Zeeuw and Zemel, 2012),
whereas ﬂoodings in our model are recurrent random events over
an inﬁnite time horizon. Hence the model structure of stochastic
climatemodels and our ﬂoodmodel is fundamentally different. How-
ever, in order to investigate the sensitivity of our results to the
stochasticity of ﬂoods, we also present simulations of our model
assuming a stochastic water level function like e.g. Viglione et al.
(2014).
The aim of this paper is to understand the mechanisms behind
investment decisions in the context of ﬂood risk prevention. For this
purpose we choose a stylized macro-economic model to investigate
the optimal investment strategy between ﬂood protection measures
and physical capital to enable economic growth. The remainder of
the paper is organized as follows. The following section provides
an introduction to the feedbacks between society and ﬂoods and
outlines the model framework and its equations. In a ﬁrst step we
present various simulations of our model and show the sensitivity of
the resulting dynamics on the investment strategy chosen. To deter-
mine the optimal investment strategy between physical and defense
capital taking into account the dynamic feedback between the eco-
nomic and hydrological system we next apply the tools of dynamic
optimization. We also show the sensitivity of the model dynamics
on the initial endowment of the economy. In particular, the opti-
mal investment strategies will be determined by the state of the
economy. Furthermore, we investigate how the optimal investment
strategy will change depending on the frequency and amplitude
of the high level water events and whether a more eﬃcient ﬂood
defense capital may foster economic growth. Last, we embed the
optimal solutions in a stochastic simulation run. The paper concludes
by discussing our scenarios in the context of ﬂooding in various
regions of the world.
2. Modeling the Interaction Between Flooding Events and
Economic Growth
2.1. Feedbacks Between Society and Floods
Floods affect settlements close to rivers by destroying existing
capital. Societies have developed different approaches to prevent or
mitigate the damage. Building dikes, levees or ﬂood control basins
may prevent ﬂood waters entering the settlements. Warning sys-
tems to assist in evacuations and settling further away from the
river (Viglione et al., 2014) may also be regarded as mitigation
measures. In our model we represent all ﬂood prevention tech-
nologies by one variable and name it defense capital. Similarly we
model the physical capital stock — which represents machines,
buildings, infrastructure—by one variable named physical capital. We
assume that a ﬂood causes damage of physical capital if the water
level exceeds a speciﬁc threshold of the defense capital. The soci-
ety chooses how much it invests into defense capital and therefore
inﬂuences the occurrence of ﬂoodings. The physical capital stock is
used to produce economic output. Aggregate output in an economy
can be used for consumption and investments in either physical or
defense capital stock. We assume that the decision of the optimal
share of output used for consumption and investment is taken by
a social planner. This means we abstract from a market framework
where factor renumerations such as interest rates on capital orwages
for labor input would determine the optimal allocation of output
between consumption and the two types of investment. We assume
a closed economy, which implies that all of the produced output will
be used, and no further trade with other communities is possible.
Fig. 1 displays the dynamics of the model. Economic output Y(t)
depends on the amount of physical capital ky(t). The output can be
either consumed c(t) or invested in physical iy(t) or defense cap-
ital id(t). The society chooses the level of consumption and the
amount of investment into physical and defense capital in order
to maximize utility. The defense capital can prevent the damage
d(W(t), kd(t)) caused by ﬂooding events. The occurrence of ﬂooding
events depends on the water level W(t). In case of ﬂooding, both
capital stocks are damaged.
2.2. Model Equations
To model the aforementioned interaction between society and
ﬂood events we ﬁrst deﬁne the utility function of the social planner
and its choice variables. Next, we determine how output is produced
in the economy and explain the dynamics of physical and defense
capital which constitute the dynamic constraints for the optimiza-
tion problem of the social planner. To model the water level we
introduce an exogenous periodic function over time. Together with
the level of defense capital, the water level will then determine the
extent of the damage.
2.2.1. Utility Function
The objective of the social planner is to maximize the discounted
stream of aggregate utilityU(c(t)) = ln(c(t)) which depends posi-
tively on the consumption level c(t):
max{c(t),id(t)}
∫ ∞
0
e−qtU(c(t))dt (1)
where q denotes the time preference and indicates to which extent
the social planner prefers utility of consumption today compared
to utility of consumption tomorrow. Consumption c(t) and invest-
ment in defense capital id(t) are control variables1 to be chosen
optimally to maximize Eq. (1), given the level of output and dynamic
constraints of physical and defense capital as stated below. More
speciﬁcally, the dynamic optimization of the social planner guaran-
tees that any decision taken today also incorporates the feedback on
the future evolution of the system.
Since at every time period consumption togetherwith investment
in physical and defense capital is bounded by the available output,
the choice of two variables implies the optimal choice of the third
variable (investment in physical capital in our case).
2.2.2. Economic Output
Output Y(t) is given by a Cobb Douglas-production function
Y(t) = Aky(t)a (2)
that depends on the physical capital stock ky(t) and an exogenous
level of technology A. The production input factor labor is normalized
to one. a ∈ [0, 1] denotes the elasticity of the production input factor
capital.
Output can be used for consumption c(t) as well as for invest-
ment in physical capital iy(t) and investment in defense capital id(t).
Since output is given in [$] and the unit of the defense capital is [m]
we need to transform investment in defense capital id given in [m]
into costs Q(id(t)) = h0(h1id(t)+h2id(t)2) given in [$]. The parameters
hi weight the linear and quadratic parts of the costs and are calcu-
lated according to Slijkhuis et al. (1997) and Bedford et al. (2008). The
overall budget constraint for the social planner is therefore given as:
Y(t) = c(t) + iy(t) + Q(id(t)) (3)
1 In a less technical setting we refer to the control variables as decision variables.
196 J. Grames, et al. / Ecological Economics 129 (2016) 193–209
Fig. 1. Overview of the dynamics within the presented model. The society chooses to consume (c(t)) or invest (iy(t) and id(t)) the economic output Y(t) into the capital stocks.
2.2.3. State Dynamics
Following the standard Ramseymodel wewrite the dynamic con-
straints by the following two state equations for physical and defense
capital:
k˙y(t) = iy(t) − d (kd(t),W(t)) ky(t) − dyky(t) (4)
k˙d(t) = id(t) − jdd (kd(t),W(t)) kd(t) − ddkd(t) (5)
Each capital stock can be augmented by investments iy and
respectively id and depreciates by a constant rate dy, respectively dd.
Moreover, ﬂood damage d(kd(t),W(t)) decreases both capital stocks.2
The ﬂood damage rate d(kd(t),W(t)) is in the interval [0,1]. We allow
for the fact that the damagemay be different for physical and defense
capital by introducing the parameter jd in Eq. (5).
2.2.4. Damage Function
Flood damage and ﬂood recovery are complex and discussed in
various papers (Di Baldassarre et al., 2015, Merz et al., 2014). Our
model constitutes a stylized model with the focus to analytically
study and understand the basic feedbacks and mechanisms between
society and hydrology. Therefore we assume a damage function
d(kd(t),W(t)) analogous to Viglione et al. (2014) and a recovery rate
based on the economic capital, the technology and the optimal
consumption behavior. Since the recovery is endogenous in our opti-
mization framework, we can describe the optimal consumption and
investment behavior given an exogenous forcing of the water level
W(t).
The amount of damage is related to the ﬂood intensity
Weff(W(t), kd(t)) = W(t) + ndkd(t) which is a function of the water
levelW(t) and the additional amount of water ndkd(t). This additional
amount of water occurs due to existing defense capital kd(t) such
as levees: Levees at one place protect this area from ﬂooding, but
increase water levels further down the river due to loss of ﬂood plain
retention (Di Baldassarre et al., 2013).
2 Rezai et al. (2014) model similar dynamics for pollution.
If the ﬂood intensity Weff(W(t), kd(t)) = W(t) + ndkd(t) exceeds
the ﬂood defense capital kd(t) and the levees spill over, a damage
of the overall capital stock occurs. The higher the effective water
level Weff(W(t), kd(t)), the higher the direct damage of the ﬂooding
(Jonkman et al., 2008). The damage rate d(kd(t),W(t)) ∈ [0, 1] gives
the relative damage of the capital stocks. Beyond kd(t), the damage
of the ﬂood is proportional to the effective water level of the ﬂood
Weff and, also, to the ﬂood duration, which is the time interval when
Weff(W(t), kd(t))> kd(t) holds. This assumption reﬂects the common
situation that structural damage is related to the water level, while
damage to industry production and stocks is related to the duration
of the inundation. The damage rate is then represented as follows.
d(kd(t),W(t)) =
{
1 − exp(−Weff (t)) if Weff (W(t), kd(t)) > kd(t)
0 else
(6)
For ease of obtaining a numerical solution of the optimization
model, we approximate the damage function (6) with a continuous
function. Still, damage (d(kd(t),W(t))> 4 with a positive 4 close to
zero) only occurs if Weff(W(t), kd(t))> kd(t). We choose the signum-
approximation function and base it on the following four assump-
tions: First, the minimum value is 0 for the water level W ≤ 0.
Second, if Weff(W(t), kd(t)) = W + ndkd > kd and W → ∞ we reach
the maximum value 1. Third, the inﬂection point is at W + ndkd =
kd. Fourth, the gradient at the inﬂection point is chosen such as to
approach inﬁnity to approximate the jump between 0 and the rel-
ative damage d>0 in Eq. (6). Furthermore, we add a multiplicative
term
(
1 − 11+W(t)g
)
that is increasing in the water level W(t) and
bounded by the interval [0,1]. This term ensures that the damage is
higher for a more intense ﬂooding.
d (kd(t),W(t)) =
1
2
(
t3 +
t2 +W(t) − (1 − nd)kd(t)√
(W(t) − (1 − nd)kd(t))2 + t1
)
×
(
1 − 1
1+W(t)g
)
(7)
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The coeﬃcients ti adjust the accuracy of the approximation
of Eq. (6) with Eq. (7), for the calculations we used t1 = 0.001,
t2 = 0 and t3 = 1.
Fig. 2 shows the damage rate with respect to the water level
W(t) for different values of defense capital stock kd(t). If the
defense capital is higher than the water level, the damage is closer to
zero (no damage) until the inﬂection pointW(t) = (1−nd)kd(t) given
in Eq. (6) and then close to one (total damage).
2.2.5. Water Function
The water levelW(t) [m] is approximated with a continuous func-
tion (Viglione et al. (2014) uses a discrete time series for ﬂood events)
to allow an analytical solution of the model. A similar function was
developed by Langer (2014) and explained in Grames et al. (2015).
The parameter js determines the maximum level of water to be
reached during a ﬂood and jm controls the frequency of ﬂood events.
W(t) =
1
2
js∑
j=1
cos(jmjt) (8)
The water function is shown in Fig. 3. The water level is 0 when
the river is bankfull and therefore the function (8) can be negative.
Negative water levels W(t) < 0 are simply treated like W(t) = 0,
since the water level only affects d(kd(t),W(t)), and d(kd(t), 0) =
d(kd(t),w−) holds for any w− < 0.
2.2.6. Model Summary
In summary, our model is represented by the following set of
equations, where we have substituted iy(t) from Eq. (3) into Eq. (4):
max{c(t)∈[0,Y(t)],id(t)∈[0,Y(t)−c(t)]}
∫ ∞
0
e−qtU(c(t))dt (9a)
s.t.
k˙y(t) = Aky(t)a − c(t) − Q(id(t)) − d(kd(t),W(t))ky(t) − dyky(t) (9b)
k˙d(t) = id(t) − jdd(kd(t),W(t))kd(t) − ddkd(t) (9c)
U(c(t)) = ln(c(t)) (9d)
Q(id(t)) = h0
(
h1id(t) + h2id(t)2
)
(9e)
Fig. 2. Form of the damage rate as a function of the water levelW(t) for various levels
of the defense capital kd(t) and for nd = 0.5. Both the water level and the defense
capital are given in meters.
Fig. 3. The periodic water level function gives quite frequent ﬂood events. In brackets
we display the units for the time and the water level itself.
W(t) =
1
2
js∑
j=1
cos(jmjt) (9f)
d(kd(t),W(t)) =
1
2
(
t3 +
t2 +W(t) − (1 − nd)kd(t)√
(W(t) − (1 − nd)kd(t))2 + t1
)
×
(
1 − 1
1+W(t)g
)
(9g)
The variables and parameters are shown in Table 1 and in Table 2.
We chose them based on existing literature and to replicate the
stylized facts discussed in the introduction.
3. Results
3.1. Simulation
To gain a better understanding of the model dynamics we start
with numerical simulations of the uncontrolled system where the
dynamics of the control variables are exogenously given. Assum-
ing perfect consumption smoothing, we postulate c(t) to be constant
over time. Investment into physical and defense capital, iy(t) and id(t)
are, therefore, functions of the exogenous consumption level and the
aggregate economic output Y(t). To determine the speciﬁc invest-
ment in either one of the capital stocks we propose two alternative
settings. We may keep the defense capital constant and therefore
choose the investment id(t) equal to the sum of the depreciation rate
of the ﬂood defense capital dkd(t) and the damage d(W(t), kd(t))kd(t).
The investment in physical capital iy(t) is then determined by the
budget constraint (3). Alternatively, we assume that the total amount
available for investments Y(t) − c(t) = i(t) = iy(t) + Q(id(t)) is
proportionally split between both investment options, i.e. for our
simulations we assume Q(id(t)) = 0.3i(t) and iy(t) = i(t)− Q(id(t)) =
0.7i(t).
Both cases are shown in the following Figs. 4–6 where we plot the
water level W as well as the effective water level Weff(W(t), kd(t)) =
W + ndkd and the dynamics of the state variables ky(t) and kd(t).
The dynamics are qualitatively similar for both cases: Whenever a
ﬂooding hits (the effective water level Weff(t) is above the defense
capital kd(t)) damage occurs and reduces the total capital stock k(t)
and hence the growth rate of the economy.
We present results of our simulations for two different sets
of initial values. Higher initial capital stocks (ky(t0) = 6.5 and
kd(t0) = 2) enable the economy to grow (see Fig. 4). Moreover,
keeping the amount of defense capital constant (Fig. 4a) allows even
faster growth compared to ever increasing amounts of investment in
defense capital (Fig. 4 b).
A small change in the initial capital stocks can make a signiﬁcant
difference in the long term behavior of the capital stocks and hence
on economic growth. If the economy does not have enough physical
capital in terms of infrastructure, machines and buildings to produce
economic output, it cannot withstand ﬂoods and economic growth
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Table 1
Variables of the model and their units of measurement.
Decision variable Interpretation Unit Init. value, function
c Consumption 109 $
iy Investment in ky 109 $
id Increase in kd after investment of Q(id) m
Endogenous variable Interpretation Unit
Y Output 109 $
ky Physical capital 109 $ 6.5, 5
kd Defense capital m 2
d Damage rate 1/year
Weff Effective water level m W(t) + ndkd(t)
Q Costs for defense capital $ Q(t0, t1, t2, id(t))
Exogenous variable Interpretation Unit
W Water level m Periodic
will decline in the long run. If the society still tries to keep the level
of the defense capital constant (see Fig. 5a) they even have to invest
such a large part of their output in defense capital that their physical
capital depreciates and the economy crashes. The situation is not as
severe in case two (see Fig. 5b) where an economy invests in defense
capital proportional to the existing capital stock. However, also in
this case, the economy will shrink in the long run. In order to avoid
such a doomsday scenario when initial capital stocks are too low, an
alternative is to reduce the amount of investment. For instance, if
Q(id(t)) is only 25% instead of 30% of the total investments, economic
growth is sustainable even for low levels of initial capital stocks (see
Fig. 6).
Overall, our simulations indicate that constant levels of decision
variables that do not adapt to the state of the economy, may in the
long run lead to a collapse of the economy. We therefore need to
consider dynamic decision rules that react to the state of the model.
Dynamic optimization methods are the tools to implement these
dynamic decision rules.
3.2. Dynamic Optimization
Given the dynamics of the capital stocks, the exogenous water
function, and the functional forms of the damage function and aggre-
gate economic output, the social planner maximizes the discounted
ﬂow of utility by choosing the optimal consumption and the opti-
mal amount of investments into defense capital. Since the exogenous
function of the water level is periodic, the optimal decisions on
consumption and investment will also follow a periodic time path.
3.2.1. Optimal Consumption and Investment Decisions
Before we present detailed analytical and numerical results of the
model we give an intuitive explanation of the dynamics of themodel.
Total aggregate output of the economy is consumed or reinvested
into either one of the capital stocks (see Eq. (3)). Applying opti-
mal control theory (Appendix A), we derive the optimal dynamics of
consumption and investment decisions:
c˙(t) = c(t)
[
Aaky(t)a−1 − d(kd(t),W(t)) − dy − q
]
(10)
i˙d(t) =
h1 + 2h2id(t)
2h2
[
Aaky(t)a−1 + (jd − 1)d(kd(t),W(t))
+jdd′(kd(t),W(t))kd + dd − dy
]
+
1
2h0h2
[d′(kd(t),W(t))ky] (11)
Both, the consumption path and the investment path, depend on
the exogenous periodic function W(t) and consequently, they will
be periodic as well. Note that W(t) also indirectly inﬂuences the
dynamics because both capital stocks are a function ofW(t). The con-
sumption dynamics are the same as in the standard Ramsey model
with a social planner (Ramsey, 1928). A higher marginal product of
physical capital (as given by the ﬁrst derivative of the production
function with respect to physical capital) as well as a lower rate of
capital depreciation and time preference will positively affect the
consumption growth rate. Damage acts like an additional deprecia-
tion on the marginal product of physical capital. The dynamics of the
Table 2
Parameters of the model and their units of measurement.
Parameter Interpretation Unit Base case Case study
A Technology [ ] 2.3
a Output elasticity of physical capital [ ] 0.3
q Time preference rate 1/year 0.07
dy Depreciation rate of econ. capital 1/year 0.1
dd Depreciation rate of defense capital 1/year 0.1
jm Frequency of ﬂoods 1/(2p) /year 1 2
js Water level of ﬂoods 1/2 m 5 10
jd Damage of defense capital relative to physical capital [ ] 1 0.1
g Increase in damage due to a higher water level [ ] 2
t1 Approximation parameter in the damage function [ ] 0.001
t2 Water peak approximation parameter [ ] 0
t3 Approximation parameter in the damage function [ ] 1
h0 Scaling parameter for dike heightening costs3 109$/m 0.5
h1 Weight for linear dike heightening costs [ ] 0.5
h2 Weight for quadratic dike heightening costs [ ] 0.5
nd Additional rise of the water level due to existing defense capital [ ] 0.5
h0 is calculated due to Slijkhuis et al. (1997) and Bedford et al. (2008).
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Fig. 4. Simulation run of the physical capital ky(t), the defense capital kd(t), the consumption c(t), the exogenous water levelW(t) and the endogenous effective water levelWeff(t).
a) Constant kd = 2with ky(t0) = 6.5 and b) proportional investments with kd(t0) = 2 and ky(t0) = 6.5 lead to economic growth. The unit of kyand c(t) is [$], all the other variables
are given in [m].
investment in ﬂood defense capital are more complex. The marginal
product of physical capital and a lower rate of depreciation of phys-
ical capital positively inﬂuence the investment rate i˙d(t), whereas a
low rate of depreciation of the defense capital will reduce the opti-
mal investment rate in ﬂood defense capital because less investment
is necessary to sustain the defense capital. Moreover, since the fac-
tor (jd − 1) is nonpositive, when damage occurs, investments in
defense capital decreases. The latter effect can be explained by the
assumption that, in case of jd >1, the damage to defense capital
is more severe than the damage to physical capital. Consequently,
investment in defense capital will be reduced. In case the damage
rate for both types of capital is the same (jd = 1), damage does
not directly inﬂuence the investment behavior. However, the ﬁrst
derivative of damage with respect to the defense capital is zero or
close to zero, so neither of the terms affect the investment dynamics.
In general, all investment decisions are scaled by the cost parameters
h0, h1 and h2. Lower costs enable higher investments.
3.2.2. Optimal Long Term Capital Stocks
Our results indicate that any optimal path of consumption and
investment that the social planner decides on will end up in one of
two possible long run solutions/limit sets (see Appendix B) depend-
ing on the initial conditions. Note, that mathematical limit sets are
different from an economic equilibrium which denotes a situation
where all markets clear. We name the inner equilibrium which has
high capital stocks and therefore high economic output the rich
economy and the boundary equilibrium which only sustains a com-
paratively small physical capital stock and no defense capital poor
economy. This notation will become apparent when we consider the
long run economic state of the economy in each case.
To identify both equilibria we solved the optimization prob-
lem ﬁrst analytically using the Pontryagin maximum principle
(Pontryagin, 1962)and thennumericallyusing thespeciﬁcMATLAB® -
ToolboxOCMat fromGrass and Seidl (2013) and the parameter values
given in Table 2.
The rich economy (Fig. 7a) invests just enough into ﬂood defense
capital to avoid ﬂoodings and consequently ﬂood damage. Conse-
quently, the effective water level Weff(t) increases due to the levee
effect. Even though the social planner never stops investing into
ﬂood risk prevention measures (id(t)>0) in the long term, they
lower the investments when they are not urgent and rather invest in
physical capital ky(t) to increase the economic output Y(t). In such an
economy, the aggregate output is quite high and therefore a constant
Fig. 5. Simulation run of the physical capital ky(t), the defense capital kd(t), the consumption c(t), the exogenous water levelW(t) and the endogenous effective water levelWeff(t).
a) Constant kd = 2 with ky(t0) = 5 and b) proportional investments with kd(t0) = 2 and ky(t0) = 5 run into economic disaster.
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Fig. 6. Simulation run where the initial values kd(t0) = 2 and ky(t0) = 5 are enough
to enable economic growth if the investment in defense capital is only 25% of the total
investment.
consumption path is sustainable. These so called smooth consump-
tion paths are characteristic of developed economies (Friedman,
1956) and are also commonly shown to be consistent with economic
growth (Acemolu, 2009). In contrast, poor economies (Fig. 7b) do not
invest at all in defense capital. Mathematically theymove to a bound-
ary periodic solution with id(t) = 0. Without any investments id(t)
the defense capital kd(t) remains zero (and so the effective waterWeff
level equals the exogenous water level W). Consequently, the soci-
ety is vulnerable and every time a high water level occurs, ﬂooding
hits the economy. The physical capital stock ky(t) decreases and less
economic output Y(t) is produced. Interestingly, the social planner
already anticipates the damage shortly before a ﬂood hits and prefers
to distribute the output to consumption rather than investment in
physical capital. Therefore consumption c(t) strictly increases until a
ﬂood hits and less consumption is possible during a ﬂooding event. It
takes time to recover and to reach the old consumption level again.
It is useful to highlight the optimal investment strategy for the
rich economy: The investments in ﬂood defense capital are always
positive and increase before a ﬂood hits. In reality, societies tend to
invest in ﬂood defense infrastructure only after big ﬂooding events
have occurred. An example is the Danube ﬂood of 1954 which
resulted in construction of a ﬂood relief channel in Vienna. Deci-
sion processes to invest in ﬂood defense management are mostly
based on political decisions and ﬁnancial considerations and only
effective if stakeholders have an immediate memory of past ﬂood-
ing. However, the optimization model shows that investing in ﬂood
defense capital before ﬂoods would be economically more advisable.
Of course we cannot forecast ﬂoods, but investing also in times of
no ﬂood instead of reacting after ﬂood occurrence is shown to be
optimal.
The long-term state dynamics of the capital stocks ky(t) and kd(t)
clearly identify the limit cycle. Note that the cycling is counterclock-
wise. For the rich economy (Fig. 8a) we see a negative correlation
of the capital stocks: Since the social planner wants to keep con-
sumption smooth, increasing investments in one capital stock lowers
the investments in the other capital stock. Moreover, a lower physi-
cal capital stock yields less output. This allows less investments and
therefore a lower total capital stock. This is always the case after high
water levels, when the priority is to build up defense capital. Hence,
ﬂoods do not only affect the economy directly via damage, but also
indirectly through a lower level of output and therefore lower capital
stocks.
The limit cycle for the poor economy (Fig. 8b) is trivial. Since there
is no defense capital kd(t), the physical capital basically increases
after a ﬂooding, reaches its maximum slightly before a ﬂooding due
to the anticipation effect and decreases quickly when a ﬂood hits the
economy.
So far we have studied the long-term behavior along the limit
cycles. It is also important to understand the path towards one of
the two limit cycles. Depending on the initial values of the capital
stocks ky and kd the economy follows a path to one of the limit cycles,
separated by the so called Skiba curve (red line in Fig. 9). Starting
(slightly) above or below the Skiba curve will lead to a rich economy
or poor economy, respectively.
Interestingly, due to the non-autonomous water function, the
Skiba curve shifts depending on the starting time relative to the next
ﬂooding event. An economy that e.g. starts slightly below point B but
at the same starting time implying that the time it takes to the next
ﬂooding has not changed, would converge to a poor economy. How-
ever, if in such a situation (i.e. when we start at a point below B) the
time to the next ﬂooding would increase as well, the economywould
converge to a rich economy.
So it is not only important where the economy starts, but also
when the next ﬂood is happening. This allows the paths towards the
long term limit cycle to be temporary below the Skiba curve after the
starting time.
For the base case where we set the parameters according to
Table 2 we choose the set of the starting points A–F and show the
different paths in Fig. 9. Different colors represent different invest-
ment combinations. I.e. along the blue line the economy invests in
both capital stocks and also consumes, the green line indicates that
the economy is not investing in ﬂood defense, but still in physical
capital, and the brown lines at starting points E and F display that the
economy consumes all the produced output without investing in any
of the capital stocks.
Economies A, B, C with less physical capital ﬁrst try to build up
physical capital. Economies starting at A or slightly below B do not
afford to invest in ﬂood defense and it is optimal to prefer consump-
tion over ﬂood defense. Economies starting at C or slightly above B
already have enough defense capital and so it is optimal for them to
sustain it. In contrast, if we start with a much higher defense capital
at point D, which does not bring any extra beneﬁt compared to the
long-term level, investments in defense capital are stopped immedi-
ately and the defense capital stock depreciates, while investments in
economic capital are slightly positive. The main part of the output is
consumed directly, unless the defense capital stock has reached the
level where it may be too small to prevent damage from ﬂoods. So,
even if the community could afford more capital, they prefer to only
invest as much as necessary to avoid ﬂoodings and rather consume
the output right away.
Economies starting close to point E, with a lot of physical cap-
ital, but slightly too less ﬂood defense capital, are living on the
edge. If they always invest at least a small amount in ﬂood defense
they manage to turn into a rich economy, whereas choosing to only
consume their economic output in the beginning leads to a poor
economy. However, it is still optimal to invest at some time into ﬂood
defense capital to lower the ﬂood damage, but below a certain level
of defense capital it is optimal to not invest in it anymore and con-
sume more. Even if the economy is very rich in terms of physical
capital but does not have enough knowledge and ﬂood defense to
build on (point F), it will not invest in ﬂood defense and rather con-
sume all the economic output. Because it knows that the next ﬂood
will destroy a major part of their capital anyways. It starts invest-
ing in physical capital when the additional amount of output pays
off the damage. The costs of investment in defense capital are cru-
cial. Fig. 10 shows, that decreasing the costs shifts the Skiba curve
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Fig. 7. One limit cycle (in normalized time) of the long-term behavior of a a) rich economy, b) poor economy showing the time series of the physical capital ky(t), the defense
capital kd(t), the economic output Y(t), the consumption c(t), the investment in defense capital id(t) and the exogenous effective water levelWeff(t) = W(t) + fdkd(t).
and signiﬁcantly enlarges the region where economies develop into
a rich economy. I.e. an economy starting with initial values between
the red and the orange line would choose the optimal investment
given low costs (h1 = 0.25) or high costs (h1 = 0.5) to end up as a
rich or poor economy, respectively.
3.2.3. Higher Frequency and Higher Intensity of Floods Changes the
Investment Behavior
So far we have studied the dynamics of the model under one
speciﬁc set of parameters. We next investigate how the optimal deci-
sions of the social planner will change when she faces a different
environment, e.g., a different occurrence of high level water events.
We study two cases: First, we assume a higher frequency of ﬂoods,
and secondly we assume higher water levels which can lead to more
pronounced ﬂoodings.
Doubling the frequency of high level water events (jm = 2) natu-
rally leads to a smaller time period of the limit cycle. Fig. 11 displays
less variation in the dynamics of the state and control variables than
in the base case. Intuitively, we would expect that a doubling of the
ﬂood frequency would translate into a 50%-reduction in the varia-
tions of the levels of the state and control variables since the time to
accumulate capital without being hit by a ﬂood is only half. However,
this is only true for poor economies. For rich economies, the differ-
ence between the highest and lowest level of the capital stock along
the limit cycle is not even a third in case of double ﬂood frequency.
Even more counterintuitive is the ﬁnding that a rich economy facing
a higher frequency of high water levels manages to have the same
consumption rate and even higher capital stocks on average as com-
pared to the case with lower frequencies of high water levels. Both
the defense and the physical capital stock are higher on average than
in the base case. So only very rich economies manage to stay rich
when they are facing higher ﬂood frequencies.
Poor economies suffer from higher ﬂood frequencies. Since more
ﬂoods lead to shorter ﬂood durations, the damage is not as high, but
occurs more often. Not only is the range of the values of the capital
stocks smaller than in the base case, also the range of the consump-
tion level is halved. Moreover, on average poor economies facing
more ﬂoodings consume less and have less economic output.
For the second case we vary the amplitude of the ﬂoods (js = 10)
and show the results in Fig. 12. In order to protect against higher
water levels, rich economies will start to invest in defense capital
earlier and to a larger extent. Consequently, less economic output is
left to invest in physical capital or for consumption. Rich economies
can consume 20% less than rich economies in the base case scenario.
This is the only chance they can keep the physical capital almost at
the same level and therefore produce a critical amount of economic
output.
Surprisingly, poor economies converge in the case of more pro-
nounced ﬂoods to an economic state with higher capital stocks
and higher consumption levels compared to the base case scenario.
Fig. 8. The state dynamics of the a) rich economy, b) poor economy.
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Fig. 9. Different initial conditions (points A–F) in several economies induce to differ-
ent long-term behavior. The red line (Skiba curve) separates the initial values leading
to a rich or to a poor economy. ky and kd are the physical capital and the defense
capital, respectively.
Although ﬂoodings hit harder, each ﬂood is shorter which results in
a wealthier economy.
When we compare rich and poor economies in case of more
pronounced ﬂoods, the capital stocks are much higher for rich
economies, so they seem to bewealthier. However, consumption and
therefore the average utility along one limit cycle of the society is
17% higher for poor economies. This means that poor communities
in heavily ﬂooded areas should actually not invest in defense capital
but rather invest in physical capital, thereby increasing output and
allowing for higher consumption levels, even though they have to
give up a smooth consumption path.
The results depend on the parameters and the characteristics of
the damage function.
3.2.4. Less Damage in the Defense Capital Stock Inﬂuences the
Dynamics of the Capital Stocks
Fig. 13 shows a case where the defense capital is not as vulner-
able as the physical capital (jd = 0.1). For this case we only need
to analyze rich economies, since poor economies do not even have
defense capital and therefore defense capital cannot be damaged.
Fig. 13 shows very similar patterns to the base case. It appears that
the ﬂoods do not destroy defense capital as heavily as physical capi-
tal. Assuming an equilibriumwithout any damagewould simply look
Fig. 10. Lower costs of investment in defense capital (h1 = 0.25, dashed lines) shift
the Skiba curve (orange dashed line instead of red solid line) and enlarge the region
where economies become a rich economy compared to the base case (h1 = 0.5, solid
lines). ky and kd are the physical capital and the defense capital, respectively.
like the base case scenario. Since the social planner knows that dam-
age does not affect the defense capital very much, she chooses a
lower investment in defense capital than in the base case and there-
fore allows small ﬂooding events for a very short time, where both
capital stocks are damaged. As a consequence, the economic output
is slightly lower, but the consumption increases in the time in-
between the ﬂooding events. This suggests that, in thismodel, people
do care more about the defense capital, if it is more vulnerable.
3.3. Simulation with Stochastic Flooding Events
The analysis performed so far does not account for the stochas-
ticity of ﬂoods. This has been done to obtain analytically results on
the long term optimal behavior of the systems. In this section we
investigate how these results change if ﬂoods occur stochastically,
i.e., when the social planner has no complete knowledge of the future
ﬂood occurrences and magnitudes. We present simulations of our
model assuming a stochastic water level function like in Viglione
et al. (2014). The timing of the high water level events is exponen-
tially distributed, as a result of a Poisson process with mean t and
arrival rate 0.2 per year, and the height of the water levels is mod-
eledwith a generalized Pareto distributionwithmean 1 (see Viglione
et al. (2014), Section 2.1, for details).
Within such a simulation exercise we compare the two policies
we derived in Section 3.2. We assume that an economy consumes
80% of its economic output in both scenarios. A rich economy invests
in ﬂood defense capital id >0 proportional to the output after con-
sumption and possible damage. If the defense capital is high enough
to prevent ﬂood damage they only maintain it and do not invest fur-
ther. A poor economy splits the output after damage proportional
into consumption and investment in physical capital, but does not
invest in ﬂood defense capital id = 0. The obtained scenarios are
listed in Table 3 together with the different initial capital stocks. To
compare the various simulation runs we record the mean and the
variance of the present value (discount rate d = 0.07) of future utility
streams U0(T) for each simulation scenario choosing the simulation
run time T = 750 years.
For the stochastic simulation runs displayed in Fig. 14we used the
same high water level event series. In the long term the stochastic
simulations are comparable to the optimal limit cycles. Economies
investing in kd(t), we again refer to them as rich economies, end up in
an almost constant state whereas economies without defense capital
(poor economies) ﬂuctuate depending on ﬂoods.
The initial conditions do not change the long term behavior in
the simulation.3 However, the present value of future utility streams
U0(T) increases for larger initial capital stocks. Nevertheless, ﬂoods
will cause more damage if the physical capital stock is high as
indicated by the dip of the capital stock in the beginning of the sim-
ulations displayed in Fig. 14a. The simulations with existing initial
defense capital are qualitatively similar to the simulations in Fig. 14
a–d, however these economies reach a higher utility since ﬂoodings
are avoided in the early years which are discounted less.
In the simulation runs summarized in Table 3 economies do not
optimally decide on their investment and consumption, neverthe-
less, we can compare the discounted stream of utility across the
different scenarios. If the initial capital is high, the net present utility
value is higher for rich economies, whereas with a low initial capital
poor economies are better of in terms of consumption. This coincides
with the optimal solution of Section 3.2.
Moreover, the variance indicates the different values in the sim-
ulation runs based on different ﬂood time series. Poor economies are
more sensitive to the ﬂood time series compared to rich economies.
3 The dynamics with higher initial capital stocks would look similar to those in
Fig. 14.
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Fig. 11. One limit cycle in case of a higher frequency of ﬂoods and therefore time period [0,0.5] for a) a rich economy, b) a poor economy. Parameters as in base case of Table 2,
but jm = 2. Note, since we plot only one period and the frequency of the periods changed, the time interval is now only [0, 0.5].
4. Discussion
In this paper we studied a socio-hydrological model of high
water level events potentially causing ﬂoodings in an economic
decision framework. In the model, a social planner, representing
the society, decides how to optimally distribute the economic out-
put between consumption, investment in ﬂood defense capital and
investment into physical capital. We apply our model to understand
the mechanisms between ﬂoods and economic growth if the water
level follows a speciﬁc exogenous ﬁxed water level function that
is time varying. Investments in ﬂood defense capital do not only
avoid direct damage in the future, but also safe opportunity costs for
reconstruction. This allows investments in physical capital and con-
sequently more economic growth in the future (Hochrainer-Stigler
et al., 2013).
We applied dynamic optimizationmethods to determine the long
run optimal solution of our system. Depending on the initial cap-
ital stocks of the economy, our system either converges to a rich
or a poor economy in the long term. This dynamic behavior is con-
sistent with an extensive literature on economic growth models
that have the potential to generate multiple equilibria and poverty
traps (Bloom et al., 2003). Graham and Temple (2006) have shown
empirically that such multiple equilibria offer a convincing explana-
tion for the income gap between poor and rich countries. Azariadis
(2005) provides an excellent survey of plausible economic mecha-
nisms that may induce multiple equilibria (including e.g. increasing
returns to scale in production andmarket failures) In ourmodel mul-
tiple equilibria result from the fact that the social planner might
be constrained in choosing enough defense capital to signiﬁcantly
lower ﬂood damage. If the economy does not have enough economic
resources to build up defense capital the economy ends up in a low
level equilibrium trap because recurrent ﬂoodings hit the economy
and cause damage. Besides the initial capital stocks which acts as his-
tory dependence in the dynamic evolution of the economy, we have
identiﬁed the costs of investment in defense capital and the timing
until the next ﬂood occurs as crucial parameters for the selection of
the low versus high level equilibrium in our model set-up.
In order to compare the model results to real world data we use
macro-economic data for countries, whereas we are aware that usu-
ally only parts of a country are under ﬂood risk. So whenever we
Fig. 12. One limit cycle in case of bigger ﬂoods for a) a rich economy, b) a poor economy. Parameters as in base case of Table 2, but js = 10.
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Fig. 13. One limit cycle in case of amore robust ﬂood defense capital. Parameters as in
base case of Table 2, but jd = 0.1. Note, due to numerical discretization of the solution
Weff is displayed different, but has the same oscillating behavior as in the other ﬁgures.
discuss rich or poor economies, we refer to broader regions or coun-
tries that are (partly) affected by ﬂoods. The rich economy manages
to build up defense capital to avoid damage and therefore follows
a smooth consumption path. The consumption rate of 70% (Fig. 7a)
equals e.g. the rate in the US.4 . Poor economies, characterized by low
levels of initial economic output or initial defense capital, optimally
decide not to invest into defense capital and end up with lower cap-
ital stocks and lower consumption rates. Every time a ﬂooding hits,
physical capital is damaged and consumption decreases strongly. The
average consumption rate of poor economies is higher than 80% of
their total output, which is around the rate of third world countries
such as Cambodia and Kenya5. If defense capital such as levees is
built, the water level may increase due to the loss of retention vol-
ume (Di Baldassarre et al., 2009, Heine and Pinter, 2012, Remo et al.,
2012). Also vulnerability may increase because of the levee effect
(Ludy and Kondolf, 2012, Montz and Tobin, 2008). However, eco-
nomic output and consequently consumption and capital stocks are
higher since ﬂood damage can be prevented. If the severity of ﬂoods
is very high we showed that a rich economy investing in defense
capital may end up with consuming less out of the total output com-
pared to a poor economy which does not invest in defense capital.
Our results are in line with actual observations. For example, the
Netherlands are facing severe ﬂoods and invest a lot in their ﬂood
management systems (Eijgenraam et al., 2014, Silva et al., 2004). The
consumption rate of around 50% in this scenario in our model ﬁts the
low consumption rate of the Netherlands.6 The Netherlands have a
higher output and the total per capita consumption is higher than in
the mentioned third world countries.
Whether an economy is rich or poor depends very much on its
economic capabilities including physical capital of ﬁrms and gov-
ernments, infrastructure and technology, but also on existing ﬂood
defense capital. If any one of these components is too small, the econ-
omy will never have the strength to become a rich economy. It will
stop investing in defense capital because it is not worth the oppor-
tunity costs of missed consumption. In reality there is always some
investment in ﬂood defense since people want to avoid death or very
strong ﬂood impacts to human life. Since this is hard to be displayed
in economic values we did not explicitly include it in the model.
4 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.CON.PETC.ZS assessed on June 3rd, 2015.
5 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.CON.PETC.ZS assessed on June 3rd, 2015.
6 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.CON.PETC.ZS assessed on June 3rd, 2015.
Table 3
Stochastic simulation runs for different initial levels of physical capital ky(t0) and
defense capital kd(t0) and two different policies (investing in defense capital (id(t) > 0)
versus not investing in defense capital (id(t) = 0)) tracking the mean and the variance
of the present value of future utility streams U0(T).
ky(t0) kd(t0) id(t) Mean (U0(T)) Var (U0(T)) Fig.
100 0 > 0 28.4 0.06 14a
100 0 0 27.2 0.14 14b
100 6 > 0 28.6 0.01
100 6 0 28.5 0.05
5 0 > 0 18.7 0.03 14c
5 0 0 19.5 0.04 14d
5 6 > 0 18.9 0.01
5 6 0 19.7 0.04
But assuming a minimum investment in defense capital would not
change the results qualitatively7. We see this scenario in many poor
countries: Without any external help, regions such as the Mekong
ﬂoodplains are ﬂooded regularly and the locals are used to the dam-
age (http://www.mrcmekong.org/). Kahn (2005) also found that rich
nations suffer less from natural disasters than poor countries. Higher
developed economies invest more in prevention of natural disas-
ters and the total losses after a disaster are smaller (Schumacher
and Strobl, 2011). How is it possible to escape the trap into a poor
economy? Since environmental conditions cannot be changed eas-
ily, only different economic environments can induce a difference. It
is essential to invest into physical capital to bring the economy on
a path to the equilibrium of the rich economy. If the country can-
not afford this by itself, external help is necessary. This help does not
only include capital investment but also ensuring strong institutions
to accordingly distribute the investments. As soon as the economy
is on the path towards the long term state of a rich economy, our
model predicts that it will never revert to a poor economy given the
same environmental and economic conditions. Staying richwhen the
economy is already there does not require any help fromoutside any-
more. This is the case if no surprise will occur (see e.g., Merz et al.,
2015).
In fact, the timing of the expected ﬂooding event plays a crucial
role. If a ﬂood is not expected in the near future the optimal behavior
is to invest less in ﬂood defense capital and therefor taking the risk
of ending up as a poor economy. This effect is stronger if the costs for
ﬂood defense capital are higher.
Fig. 15 summarizes the scenarios of this paper. Each scenario is
represented in a different color and we plot the case of a rich and a
poor economy for each scenario. The amount of physical capital of
the rich economies is quite similar in every scenario. Naturally, the
range differs from scenario to scenario: In case of more ﬂoods we
observe a lower variation of physical capital while the level of both
capital stocks is higher compared to the base case.
In the scenario where we increase the severity of ﬂoods, the
defense capital has to be very high in order for the economy to
remain rich. So it is very hard to obtain such a rich economy and the
willingness to invest in ﬂood defense capital has to be very high, too.
We only encounter this case in ﬁrst world countries that are highly
affected by ﬂoods such as the Netherlands. This is very much con-
frontedwith ﬂoods, can afford defense capital, and is willing to invest
in it (Vis et al., 2003).
In the scenario of less damage people are minimalists and only
invest in their capital stocks as much as necessary to overcome
ﬂoods. As a consequence, their capital stocks are lower than in any
other scenario. Their consumption is just as high as in the base case,
7 Introducing aminimum investment in defense capital would only be a small linear
transformation in investment and consequently in consumption and aggregate utility.
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Fig. 14. Simulation runs of the physical capital ky(t), the defense capital kd(t), the consumption c(t), the exogenous water level W(t) and the endogenous effective water level
Weff(t). The unit of ky(t) and c(t) is [$], all the other variables are given in [m]. a) and c) show the scenario of the rich economy and b) and d) the poor economy. The initial conditions
for a) and b) are ky(t0) = 100 and kd(t0) = 0, for c) and d) ky(t0) = 5 and kd(t0) = 0.
but not as smooth since it decreases during ﬂooding events. The con-
sumption cycle in this scenario has similar dynamics as the poor
equilibria of the other cases.
In case of poor economies, ﬂood intensity and frequency directly
impact the wealth of the economy. More ﬂoods more often cause
damage of existing physical capital, but the economies have expe-
rience with ﬂoodings and rebuild the infrastructure quickly. In con-
trast, if bigger ﬂoods happen less frequently, the damage is much
higher and the poor economies need longer and also have to invest
more into physical capital to regenerate. In total, the consumption is
Fig. 15. Long-term state dynamics for the cases of Figs. 7–13.
higher than in the scenario with fewer ﬂoods. So even if ﬂoods hit
harder, as long as they do not appear too often, the living standard
can be relatively high in between ﬂoods.
Overall, the economic output is almost equal for all rich
economies independently of the frequency and intensity of ﬂoods.
Only the amount of defense capital and the variations of physical
capital along the long run economic state differs. Furthermore, the
economic output in poor economies is much lower than for rich
economies, but it is about the same level for any poor economy in
various cases. Besides the higher economic output and the mostly
higher consumption for rich economies, they do have the capaci-
ties and resources to anticipate damages before a ﬂood hits. On the
other hand, poor economies do not have the economic potential and
are therefore not ﬂexible to adjust to ﬂoods beforehand. The only
anticipation is to stop investing into physical capital shortly before a
ﬂooding8 , but basically poor economies are affected by ﬂoods every
time they occur and have to start over again rebuilding capital stocks
and increasing consumption.
Optimization is important to use the resources eﬃciently. The
simulation in Section 3.1 shows the dynamics of the model. Even in
case of positive economic growth, damage occurs during every high
water level event, whereas in the optimizationmodel rich economies
can avoid damage in the long run, even though they are investing
less, but at the right time. Moreover, in the scenarios with declin-
ing economic growth the economies even converge to zero capital
stocks. In the optimization case it will never happen that people
8 This is true for our model assumptions. In reality the timing of ﬂoods is not known
in advance and only last minute protections can be built.
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invest in ﬂood defense capital if they cannot even afford their basic
needs for living. They therefore alwaysmanage to sustain some phys-
ical capital and to have enough resources to consume and invest
again in production after a ﬂooding event.
Also when we look at simulation runs with stochastic high water
level events the present value of utility is larger for rich economies
if the initial capital stocks are suﬃciently high. This reﬂects the opti-
mal path towards the limit cycle for rich economies in our dynamic
optimization set-up. Contrary, the present value of the future util-
ity streams is smaller for economies investing in defense capital than
for economies which do not build up a defense capital stock if the
initial capital stock is low. This scenario reﬂects all the paths going
towards the limit cycle of the poor economy in our dynamic opti-
mization set-up, where the strategy to not invest in defense capital
is optimal. Apparently, if the economy starts with low initial capi-
tal stocks it will not pay off to invest in ﬂood defense capital and
this is the incentive to remain poor and vulnerable. As we have
also seen in the optimization, economies do not manage to escape
that poor scenario with their own strength, but need external help
to do so.
To sum up, if a social planner would base his decision on the
present value of future utility given uncertainty of ﬂood events, he
would still choose the same policy as in the long term optimiza-
tion based on a deterministic water level function. For instance, ﬂood
frequency analysis is used in hydrology to estimate the expected fre-
quency of exceedance of ﬂood levels for a given time horizon (see,
among many, Gumbel, 1941, 1958, Chow et al., 1988). In princi-
ple our optimization model with the deterministic exogenous water
level function based on these expected parameter values can help
identifying optimal investment strategies for the long run. Of course,
because of the stochasticity of ﬂooding, sensitivity analysis needs to
be performed for these optimal scenarios, in order to assess their
robustness (Blöschl et al., 2013).
Comparing the results in our paper with the simulation model
of Di Baldassarre et al. (2013) and Viglione et al. (2014), on which
our model set-up is based, we may highlight further important
differences: First, they found that, in certain circumstances, invest-
ing in ﬂood defense capital may lead to less economic growth
than facing frequent small ﬂoodings. This is because rare ﬂood-
ings may be catastrophic since societies erroneously consider ﬂood-
plains more secure after building levees and invest in building
and living there. In our optimization model, in which the social
planner has the knowledge of ﬂood occurrence and magnitude,
rich economies can manage ﬂoods and therefore avoid catastrophic
ﬂoodings.
Second, a lower decay of levees leads to higher growth rates in
Viglione et al. (2014). In contrast, in our model the social planner
decides to invest just a minimum into ﬂood management and phys-
ical capital to consume more than in the scenario with a higher
depreciation rate.
Our approach is to conceptualize the interaction of human deci-
sion making and ﬂood risk management within a macro-economic
framework. Our aim is to understand the mechanisms rather than
matching speciﬁc cases or predicting the future development of
societies. As models cannot and should not capture all details of
the reality, we do not claim that this is the only true represen-
tation of communities in ﬂood risk areas. However, it enables
us to discuss certain dynamics and policies in the ﬁeld of socio-
hydrology.
Starting from the results in this paper, future work will focus
on the sensitivity of the model results to the assumptions made,
and on the assumption of perfect knowledge of future water lev-
els by the social planner. We expect that, even though uncer-
tainty/stochasticity of natural events will result in more complex
dynamics, the results of this work will provide the fundamental
baseline over which other mechanism will show up.
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Appendix A. Dynamics of the Optimal Controls
We are analyzing the model analogous to Barro and Sala-i Martin
(2004) and Millner and Dietz (2015).
A.1. The Hamiltonian
To analytically optimize themodel given in Eqs. (9a–g) we formu-
late the Hamiltonian function.
H(c(t), id(t), ly(t), ld(t)) (A.1)
= U(c(t)) + ly(t)
[
Aky(t)a − c(t) − Q (id(t)) − d(kd(t),W(t))ky − dyky(t)
]
+ld [id(t) − jdd(kd(t),W(t))kd − ddkd(t)]
The Pontryagin conditions are
∂H
∂c(t)
= U′(c(t)) + ly(t)[−1] = 0 (A.2a)
∂H
∂ id(t)
= ly(t) [−Q ′(id(t))] + ld = 0 (A.2b)
∂H
∂ky(t)
= ly(t)
[
A(t)aky(t)a−1 − d(kd(t),W(t)) − dy
]
= qly(t) − l˙y(t)
(A.2c)
∂H
∂kd(t)
= ly(t) [−d′(kd(t),W(t))ky]
+ld [−jdd′(kd(t),W(t))kd − jdd(kd(t),W(t)) − dd]
= qld(t) − l˙d(t) (A.2d)
∂H
∂ly(t)
= Aky(t)a − c(t)−Q(id(t))− d (kd(t),W(t)) ky − dyky(t) = k˙y(t)
(A.2e)
∂H
∂ld(t)
= id(t) − jdd (kd(t),W(t)) kd − ddkd(t) = k˙d(t). (A.2f)
A.2. The Canonical System
We rewrite the ﬁrst order condition Eq. (A.2a), use the ln and take
the total time derivative.
ly(t) = U′(c(t)) =
1
c(t)
(A.3)
ln (ly(t)) = ln
(
1
c(t)
)
(A.4)
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l˙y(t)
ly(t)
= − c˙(t)
c(t)
(A.5)
Analogous we can use the ﬁrst order condition Eq. (A.2b).
ld(t) = ly(t) [Q ′ (id(t))] = ly(t)h0 [h1 + 2h2id(t)] (A.6)
ln (ld(t)) = ln (ly(t)h0 [h1 + 2h2id(t)])
= ln (ly(t))+ ln(h0) + ln (h1 + 2h2id(t)) (A.7)
l˙d(t)
ld(t)
=
l˙y(t)
ly(t)
+
2h2 i˙d(t)
h1 + 2h2id(t)
(A.8)
So we use Eqs. (A.5), (A.8), (A.2c), (A.2d), (A.2e), and (A.2f) to write
the canonical system.
c˙(t) = −c(t) l˙y(t)
ly(t)
(A.9a)
i˙d(t) =
h1 + 2h2id(t)
2h2
[
l˙d(t)
ld(t)
− l˙y(t)
ly(t)
]
(A.9b)
l˙y(t) = −ly(t)
[
Aaky(t)a−1 − d (kd(t),W(t)) − dy − q
]
(A.9c)
l˙d(t) =ly(t) [d′(kd(t),W(t))ky]
+ ld [jdd′(kd(t),W(t))kd + jdd(kd(t),W(t)) + dd + q] (A.9d)
k˙y(t) = Aky(t)a − c(t) − Q(id(t)) − d(kd(t),W(t))ky − dyky(t) (A.9e)
k˙d(t) = id(t) − jdd (kd(t),W(t)) kd − ddkd(t) (A.9f)
A.3. Euler Equations for Optimal Controls
The dynamics of the optimal controls are given by the Euler
equations. Applying the Pontryagin conditions to this control
problem we yield the Euler equations for the optimal controls. We
substitute Eq. (A.9c) into Eq. (A.9a) to describe the optimal consump-
tion and additional Eqs. (A.9d) and (A.6) into Eq. (A.9b) to see the
optimal investments in defense capital.
c˙(t) = −c(t)−ly(t)
[
Aaky(t)a−1 − d (kd(t),W(t)) − dy − q
]
ly(t)
= c(t)
[
Aaky(t)a−1 − d (kd(t),W(t)) − dy − q
]
(A.10)
i˙d(t) =
h1 + 2h2id(t)
2h2
⎡
⎣ ld(t)h0[h1+2h2id(t)] [d′(kd(t),W(t))ky]
ld(t)
+
ld [jdd′(kd(t),W(t))kd + jdd(kd(t),W(t)) + dd + q]
ld(t)
−−ly(t)
[
Aaky(t)a−1 − d (kd(t),W(t)) − dy − q
]
ly(t)
]
=
h1 + 2h2id(t)
2h2
[
1
h0[h1 + 2h2id(t)]
[d′ (kd(t),W(t)) ky]
+ [jdd′ (kd(t),W(t)) kd + jdd (kd(t),W(t))+ dd + q]
+
[
Aaky(t)a−1 − d(kd(t),W(t)) − dy − q
] ]
=
h1 + 2h2id(t)
2h2
[
Aaky(t)a−1 + (jd − 1)d (kd(t),W(t))
+jdd′ (kd(t),W(t)) kd + dd − dy
]
+
1
2h0h2
[d′ (kd(t),W(t)) ky] (A.11)
Appendix B. Two Solutions of the Model
To solve the model given in Eqs. (9a–g) we proceed as follows.
First, to ﬁnd an initial solution, we redeﬁne the periodic water func-
tion W
(
c, W¯ , t
)
:= W¯ + cY(t), where Y(t) refers to the water
function Eq. (9f).
For the continuation of the function with a periodic solution we
consider the more general boundary value problem (BVP)
x˙(t) = f (x(t),W(c, W¯ , t)), x(t) ∈ Rn, t ∈ [0, 1] (B.1a)
x(0) = x(1) (B.1b)
with
W
(
c, W¯ , t
)
= W¯ + cY(t), Y(0) = Y(1). (B.1c)
For c = 0 and W¯ = 1 we found two feasible and optimal
solutions xˆ1 and xˆ2, each corresponding to a different constraint
constellation (i.e. id(t)>0 and id(t) = 0). For these two cases the
following continuation steps were used: Since x( • ) ≡ xˆ is an iso-
lated solution and fx(xˆ, W¯) is non-singular, fc
(
xˆ, W¯
)
= 0 and the
minimal period of Y(t) is one. For an isolated solution there exists
e>0 such that for every c ∈ Be(0) a unique solution x( • ,c) for Eqs.
(B.1a–c) exists. Numerically these solutions can be found e.g. by the
pseudo-arclength or Moore–Penrose continuation. As long as x( • ,c)
itself is an isolated solution and the linearization of Eqs. (B.1a–c) is
non-singular the continuation proceeds.
For the actual computation the Moore–Penrose continuation in
the implementation of the speciﬁc MATLAB® -Toolbox OCMat from
Grass and Seidl (2013) was used, whereas it was shown that in the
cases of xˆ1 and xˆ2 the linearizationwas always non-singular. This was
done in two steps:
1. Continuation along c from 0 to 1.
2. Continuation along W¯ from 1 to 0.
So we derived the two solutions for the model given in
Eqs. (9a–g), whereas the periodic water function is W
(
c, W¯ , t
)
=
W¯ + cY(t) = Y(t) and therefore equals Eq. (9f).
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